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ALTERNATIVES FOR THE RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION AFTER
ALYESKA v. WILDERNESS SOCIETY
In the United States, absent contrary *statutory authority, the
prevailing litigant in a civil action is not entitled to collect attorney
and expert witness fees from the loser.' There are, however, notable
statutory and judicially created exceptions to this "American Rule"
against fee shifting. As the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society et. aL 2 noted, the judicially created
exceptions arise out of the "inherent power in the courts to allow
attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress." 3 Although commentators have vigorously urged that the
traditional American Rule be abolished, 4 the recent approach taken
by the lower federal courts has been to broaden the application of
the equitable exceptions. This trend was particularly discernable in
the attorney and witness fee awards that were the product of public
interest environmental litigation. At the root of this liberalizing trend
was a genuine concern that responsible standard bearers, acting on
behalf of the general public welfare, not be discouraged from pursuing their environmental concerns in the courts. In the democratic
1. The "American Rule" generally includes reasonable attorneys' fees in both Federal
54.71 [21, at 1703-04 and note 2 (2
and State courts. See 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice
ed. 1972). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) which reads:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs....
not including the fees and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the
prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or
any agency or official of the United States acting in his official capacity, in
any court having jurisdiction of such action.
Note, however, that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 makes no mention of expert witness fees. In view of
the fact that attorneys' fees are expressly excluded from the statute, it could be argued that
the failure to similarly exclude witness fees would imply Congressional authorization for
their recovery. See King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees In Public Interest Environ.
mental Litigation, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 27, 30, at note 10 (1973).
2. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society et. at., 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.
Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 144 (1975) thereinafter cited asAlyeska].

3. 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975).
4. A particularly forceful and compelling argument against the "American Rule" may be
found in Professor Ehrenzweig's own personal experience with America's fee shifting
anomaly. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Cal. L.
Rev. 792 (1966). See also Kuenzel, The Attorneys' Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?49
Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an
Element of Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619 (1931).
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tradition, it is only the private citizen that can be expected to "guard
the guardian." '
Reacting to the exhortations of the President 6 and the apparent
will of Congress, 7 lower federal courts, in the early 1970's, began to
fashion judicially created exceptions to the general rule against fee
shifting in causes concerning the protection of the environment.
Cognizant of the fact that most public interest environmental litigation seeks to advance a conservation goal on behalf of the general
public and, moreover, that environmental litigants usually seek
specific relief, such as declaratory judgments, injunctions or
mandamus, federal courts began awarding fees in increasing numbers of suits. Prevailing parties, 8 losing parties, 9 and those parties
whose action was mooted by Congress' 0 were awarded fees for their
5. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
6. In his August, 1971 "Message to the Congress," former President Nixon delivered the
following encouraging words to would be citizen litigants who were inclined to preserve the
quality of the environment through suits in the court system:
In the final analysis, the foundation on which environmental progress rests in
our society is a responsible and informed citizenry. My confidence that our
Nation will meet its environmental problems in the years ahead is based in
large measure on my faith in the continued vigilance of American public
opinion and in the continued vitality of citizen efforts to protect and improve
the environment.
The National Environmental Policy Act has given a new dimension to citizen
participation and citizen rights-as is evidenced by the numerous court actions
through which individuals and groups have made their voices heard.
7 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1132, 1133 (1971).
7. Congress, under the new environmentally conscious legislation of the early 1970's,
granted standing to any private citizen-litigant regardless of the amount in controversy or
the citizenship of the parties. See also U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 37 L.Ed.2d 254, 93
S.Ct. 2405 (1973). Moreover, any private citizen may bring a civil action in Federal District
Court against violators of standards issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
as well as suits against EPA Administrators or similar federal officials who have failed in
performing non-discretionary duties, It was thought that such Congressional intent to
dispose of potential barriers was evidence of a desire to encourage privately initiated
environmental litigation. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(e), § 1415(g)(5) (Supp. 1970); 42
U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2(e) (Supp. 1976); 42 U.S.C.S. § 4911(e) (1973).
8. Attorneys' fees were awarded by lower federal courts under the private attorney
general theory in numerous instances. See e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. FRI,
(D.C. Cir. 1975); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (ND Cal. 1972). See
F.2d
also, supra note 11.
9. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973); Citizens Ass'n. of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F.Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1974).
10. The action, brought by the Wilderness Society s6ught declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Secretary of the Interior for noncompliance with the provisions of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, sec. 28 as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. The State of Alaska
and Alyeska Pipeline Service Company were later permitted to intervene. Subsequently,
respondent Wilderness Society's cause of action based on a violation of NEPA was mooted
by Congressional passage of Pub. L. 93-153, Tit. 1, § 101, 87 Stat. 576m, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (Nov. 16, 1973). The allowance of fees was based on both the mooted cause of action
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assertion of the public interest. Indeed, six circuits had adopted the
"private attorney general" rationale for justifying their awards of
attorney and witness fees. ' 1
In Alyeska, the United States Supreme Court was asked to affirm
this lower-court-sanctioned exception to the American Rule. Speaking for a five to two majority, 1 2 Mr. Justice White refused to extend
the "private attorney general" doctrine into the area of environmental litigation. 1 3 The Court noted that it was within the sole
discretion of the Congress to determine whether fee shifting should
be permitted to further the public welfare. The underlying rationale
for the majority opinion was enunciated by Mr. Justice White:
... [C] ongressional utilization of the private attorney general concept
can in no sense be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary
to jettison the traditional rule against non-statutory allowances to
the prevailing party and to award attorneys' fees whenever the
courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular statute
important enough to warrant the award.' 4
Thus, faced with the fundamental policy decision of balancing the
interests of those who would seek the award of fees, as a necessary
incident to making the injured party "whole," against those who
would argue that parties should not be penalized for seeking to
prosecute or defend their rights, the Court chose to defer to the
Congress.
Faced with the clear language of the Supreme Court, the question
and the unaffected cause arising out of Alyeska Pipeline Company's violation of the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920. For a full chronology of the events surrounding the progress of the
Alyeska case through the courts see Dominick and Brody, The Alyeska Pipeline; Wilderness
Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 Am. U. L. Rev. 337
(1973).
11. Sousa v. Travisono,
F.2d
, (1st Cir. 1975); Comist v. Richland Parish School
Board, 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974);
Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1974); and Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Leed, Development of the Fee Shifting Doctrine:Aftermath of the Alyeska Decision, Barrister 36, at note 3 (Winter, 1976).
12. Justices Blackmun, Burger, Rehnquest and Stewart concurred with the opinion of
Justice White. Justices Brennan and Marshall filed dissenting opinions. Justices Douglas and
Powell took no part in the decision.
13. Arguably court watchers were put on notice of the Supreme Court's willingness to
leave the question of the awarding of fees to Congress in the earlier opinion found in F. 0.
Rich Co. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lbr. Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974) wherein the
Court wrote:
The perspectives of this profession, the consumers of legal services, and other
interested groups should be weighed in any decision to substantially undercut
the application of the American Rule in such litigation. Congress is aware of
the issue. Thus whatever the merit of arguments for a further departure from
the American Rule ... those arguments are properly addressed to Congress.
417 U.S. at 131 (footnote omitted).
14. 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975).

NA TURAL RESOURCES IOURNAL

[Vol. 16

confronting the private attorney contemplating the initiation of
public interest environmental litigation must be to appraise the various avenues for the recovery of fees which remain open after
Alyeska. Before examining these specific alternatives, however, this
comment will first look to the development of the American Rule
and its judicially created exceptions. The comment will then explore
the expansion of the private attorney general exception into the area
of environmental litigation and, finally, it will analyze the limiting
language of the Supreme Court and its effect on the attorney who
seeks to initiate public interest litigation but who is unsure as to the
prospects for his compensation.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE "AMERICAN RULE"
In the United States, absent contrary statutory authority, the
prevailing litigant is not entitled to collect his attorneys' fees from
the loser. This American Rule governing the allocation of the relative
burden of the costs of litigation, is an anomaly in the jurisprudential
world. Analysts and legal commentators have sharply criticized the
prevailing persistence in denying fee shifting.' I Most critical discussions of the American Rule begin by comparing the English system
to that found in the United States. Although the history of American
jurisprudence is rooted in the common law of England, it is and has
been a common understanding in the United States that the difference between the American and English rules as to fees lies in the
fact that under the English system the successful party may recover
the charges he has to pay his own attorney.' 6 This distinction, however, is both an understatement as well as an exaggeration, for, even
though English costs are regularly imposed at the discretion of the
Court, they rarely include the entire financial burden paid to the
barrister and solicitor, and yet they may also cover the cost of many
items not allowed in the United States.' 7
The American Rule, given the status of black letter law by the
Court in Alyeska, has been repeatedly challenged. Its development
has been the object of scholarly analysis and the winding course that
the evolution of the Rule has taken has led at least one commentator
to argue that the "American Rule" is a "historical accident." ' 8
Whatever its final label, the development of the American Rule is
noteworthy. For without an understanding of the nature of the Rule,
15. Supra at note 3.
16. 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).

17. Goodhart, Costs, 38 Y. L. J. 849, 856 (1929).
18. Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 799.
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the reader would be ill-equipped to understand the exceptions to the
Rule and the ramifications of the limiting language of the Alyeska
decision.
The Development of the Allocation of A ttorneys'Feesin England
The history of the allocation of costs in England follows a relatively orderly path of development in comparison with that in the
United States, although a distinction must be drawn between the
costs and attorneys' fees awarded in the common law courts and
those awarded in equity.' 9
At common law, the rule as to costs was based entirely on statute.
If the plaintiff failed in his action, he was amerced pro falso clamore;
if he succeeded, the defendant was in misericordiafor the detention
of the plaintiff's right. 2 0 At that time, however, the award of attorneys' fees was at the Court's discretion. It was not until the
Statute of Gloucester, in 1278, 2 ' that the plaintiff could recover his
costs at law. Similarly, since 1607 English courts have been
empowered to award counsel fees to defendants in all actions where
such awards might be made to plaintiffs. 2 2 These statutory provisions remained the basis for the law of allocation of costs until
1875 when an important change in the principle on which costs were
awarded was made by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts of 1873
and 1875.2 3 The short, nine line order stated that, with certain
exceptions, "the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the High
Court shall be in the discretion of the Court." Although the Rules of
the Court were rewritten and greatly expanded in 1883, this general
principle is still found today. 2 4
In equity, the giving of costs was entirely discretionary. The difference between equity and the common law, however, lay in the fact
that in equity costs were in the discretion of the Court while at
common law they followed the event. Therefore, Mr. Goodhart was
able to conclude that the 1875 Rules of the Court, while placing
no change of principle in
equity costs on a statutory basis, made
2
them as they did in common law costs. 5
19. Goodhart, supra note 17, at 851.
20. Id. at 851-52.
21. Stat. of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1,c. 1 (1278).
22. Stat. of Westminster, 3 Jac. 1,c. 3 (1607). This statute, which expressly mentioned
only "the costs of this writ purchased," was from the outset liberally construed to include
all costs of the suit including counsel fees. Goodhart, supra note 17, at 842.
17, at 842.

23. 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66 (1873); 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (1875).
24. Goodhart, supra note 17, at 854.
25. Id. at 854.
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Today, it is customary in England, after litigation of the substantive claims, to conduct separate hearings before a special "taking
Master" in order to determine the appropriateness and size of the
counsel fee award. To prevent these ancillary proceedings from
fees which may be
becoming unduly lengthy and burdensome,
26
included in an award are usually prescribed.
The Development of the Allocation of A ttorneys'Feesin
the United States
In the United States, the development of the allocation of fees
took a different course from that which evolved in England, and that
course often defies easy analysis.
During the first years of the federal court system, Congress provided through the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,27 and subsequent
legislative enactments, that the federal courts were to follow the
practices with respect to the awarding of attorneys' fees in the courts
of the states in which the federal courts were located. By 1800,
however, these statutory provisions had either expired or had been
repealed. 2 8
During this early stage in our nation's history, the Court first
enumerated what would later become the black letter law in the area
of fee shifting. The Court ruled that the judiciary would not create a
general rule allowing the award of fees in the federal court system
In 1796, in Arcambel v. Wiseabsent contrary statutory authority.
29
wrote:
Court
Supreme
the
man,
The general practice of the United States is in opposition to it [the
award of attorneys' fees as damages] ; and even if that practice were'
not strictly correct in principle it is entitled to the respect of the
Court, till it is changed or modified by statutes.
Although the Court has repeatedly been criticized for its failure to
examine the underlying policy considerations of the American Rule
by its insistence on deferring to Congress, the Supreme Court has
consistently adhered to this earlier decision. 30 Moreover, the Court,
26. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
27. By the passage of the Judiciary Act of September 29, 1789, the Federal Courts were
to follow the State practice with respect to rates of fees under admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. The Federal Judiciary Act, I Stat. 73, ch. 20 touched on costs in Sections 9, 11,
12, 22, and 23, but as to counsel fees only provided that the U.S. Attorney in each district
"shall receive as compensation for his services such fees as shall be traced therefor in the
respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be."
28. See generally 421 U.S. 240, 247-250 (1975).

29. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, (1796).
30. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 14 L.Ed. 181 (1851); Oelrichs v.
Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 21 L.Ed. 43 (1872); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
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in Alyeska v. Wilderness Society, expressly stated that its refusal to
sanction the lower federal court award of fees was not intended to be
interpreted* as an assessment of the validity of the Rule. The Court
wrote:
We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the "American
Rule" with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees. It has been
criticized in recent years, and courts have been urged to find exceptions to it. It is also apparent from our national experience that the
encouragement of private action to implement public policy has
been viewed as desirable in a variety of circumstances. But the rule
followed in our courts with respect to attorneys' fees has survived. 3
Thus, we note that there is a marked similarity between the
Supreme Court's initial enunciation of the American Rule at the turn
of the 19th Century and the pronouncement of the Court in 1975.
Absent statutory encouragement to the contrary, it appears that the
Court will continue to refrain from breaking with tradition.
In 1842, however, Congress did grant to the Court authority to
prescribe the items and the amounts which could be taxed in the
federal system.3 2 The brief legislative history of the statute indicated
that the purpose was to implement the reduction of fee bills in the
federal courts. The Supreme Court, however, took no action under
this statutory mandate. 3
In 1853, apparently acting at the invitation of the Supreme Court,
Congress undertook the standardization of allowable costs in federal
court proceedings. 3 4 Congress recognized the fact that there was
great diversity as to the amounts and the award of attorneys' fees in
the various courts. The proposed legislation was designed to mitigate
some of the excessive fee awards that had inspired the bill. 3 s The
450, 21 L.Ed. 203 (1872); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 25 L.Ed. 116 (1879);
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 18
L.Ed2d 475 (1967); F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31,94
S. Ct. 2157, 2163-66 (1974); See also Alyeska v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
31. 421 U.S. 240, 270-71 (1975).
32. 5 Stat. 518, ch. 188, § 7 (August 23, 1842).
33. 421 U.S. 240, 250 (1975).
34. The proposed legislation closely follows the Supreme Court's affirmation of their
earlier decision in Arcambel v. Wiseman. In Day v. Woodworth, 354 U.S. (13 How.) 362
(1851) the Court was again given the opportunity to affirm the award of attorneys' fees.
The Court, however, concluded that legal taxed costs were "all the law allows." Id. at 372.
35. Evidence of this Congressional intent may be found in Senator Bradbury's remarks
recorded in 27 Cong. Globe App., 32d Cong. 2d Sess., 207 (February 12, 1853):
There is now no uniform rule either for compensating the ministerial officers
of the courts, or for the regulation of the costs in actions between private
suitors. One system prevails in one district, and a totally different one in
another; and in some cases it would be difficult to ascertain that any attention
had been paid to any law whatever designed to regulate such proceedings....
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legislation specified in detail the nature and amounts of taxable items
in the federal courts, 3 6 and the Supreme Court repeatedly enforced
the stated goal of the Act in limiting excessive fee awards. In The
Baltimore, the Court deemed a counsel fee award of $500.00 to be
excessive and ordered that judgment be set aside. The Court concluded:
Fees and costs, allowed to the officers therein named, are now
regulated by the act of the 26th of February, 1853, which provides,
in its Ist section, that in lieu of compensation now allowed by law
to attorneys, solicitors, proctors, district attorneys, clerks, marshals,
witnesses, jurors, commissioners, and printers, the following and no
other compensation shall be allowed.
Attorneys, solicitors, and proctors may charge their clients reasonably for their services, in addition to the taxable costs, but nothing
can be taxed as cost against the opposite party, as an incident to the
judgment, for their services, except the costs and fees therein
described and enumerated. .... 37
In Flanders v. Tweed,3 8 decided only three years later, the Court
employed nearly identical language to that found in The Baltimore in
justifying its refusal to sustain a similar jury award of $6,000.00 for
attorneys' fees.
Although Congress has made certain provisions allowing the award
of attorneys' fees under statute, it has nevertheless refrained from
extending the general statutory rule that fee shifting be limited to
sums specified by this costs statute. The Court in Alyeska took
judicial notice of the fact that the 1853 Act has been carried forward
to the revised code of 1948 in Sections 1920 and 1923 (a) without
any apparent Congressional intention to alter the controlling rule. 3 9
Thus, on the basis of this analysis of the American Rule which has
spanned the history of the American judicial system, the United
States Supreme Court was able to conclude that "the rule followed
in our courts, with respect to attorneys' fees, has survived. It is
deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not
for us to invade the legislature's province ...... 4
It will hence be seen that the compensation of the officers, and the costs taxed
in civil suits, is made to depend in a great degree on that allowed in the State

courts. There are no two States where the allowance is the same.
The abuses that have grown up in the taxation of attorneys' fees which the
losing party has been compelled to pay in civil suits, have been a matter of
serious complaint.
36. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 175, § 12, 10 Stat. 161.

37. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 392 (1869).
38. 82 U.S. (1S Wall.) 450, 452-53 (1872).

39. 421 U.S. 240, 255 (1975).
40. Id. at 271.
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To be sure, there are judicially created exceptions to this general
rule which remain unaffected by the Court's ruling in Alyeska. As
the Supreme Court noted, "These exceptions are unquestionably
assertions of inherent power in the Courts to allow attorneys' fees in
particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress.""
However, as the Supreme Court in Alyeska PipelineService Co. v.
Wilderness Society observed, the lower federal court expressly refrained from employing any of the recognized exceptions. Rather,
the lower court chose to base its award of counsel fees on an expansion of the private attorney general theory, heretofore only affirmed
by the Supreme Court in the area of civil rights. 2 In striking down
this expansion of the private attorney general concept into the area
of public interest environmental litigation, the Supreme Court has
deposited a barrier to the recovery of fees and consequently has, to
some degree, limited the initiation of public interest litigation
altogether. Before examining alternatives, however, it is necessary to
examine existing exceptions to the American Rule. The practicing
attorney may choose to frame his cause of action so as to capitalize
on the inherent equitable power of the court to award counsel and
witness fees.
EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE AMERICAN RULE
As the Court in Alyeska observed, it is well within the province of
the judiciary to create equitable exceptions to the American Rule
in order that the expenses of the litigation be awarded, even though
they would not normally be taxed as costs. Traditionally, the
judicially created exceptions to the American Rule have been limited
to three areas. Attorneys' fees could be recovered when: (1) "the
losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for
oppressive reasons' ,;4 (2) a party to the action has disobeyed an
order of the court;4 4 and (3) the litigation has created an "equitable
fund."4 5 In addition to these three well-settled exceptions, we must
add the newly evolved private attorney general exception as well.
As we have previously noted, however, in the area of environmental public interest litigation, this court exception has been dealt a
41. Id. at 259.
42. Id. at 260.
43. Id. at 258 quoting F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974), see e.g. Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143, 144 (8th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Bell
v. School Board of Powhatan County Virginia, 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963); Hall v.

Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973).
44. Toledo Scales Co. v. Computing Sale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923).
45. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1938).
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serious, if not fatal, blow by the Court in Alyeska.4 6 The development of this exception in the area of environmental litigation will be
explored at greater length in a later portion of this comment. For the
moment, let us focus on the settled exceptions of the American
Rule. For within them it may be possible to frame a cause of action
which would allow the private attorney to tax the losing party for
the expenses he incurred in bringing the action.
The "Bad Faith" Exception
It is, and has been, a long standing rule of law that a court may
penalize bad faith by shifting from the innocent party to the recalcitrant or vexatious party the legal expenses incurred either in bringing or defending the action in controversy. 4 7 Fee awards arising out
of the "bad faith" exception have been awarded at the discretion of
the court in a variety of factual settings. For example, in Universal
Oil Co. v. Root Refining Co.48 the Court found in the case of fraud:
No doubt, if the court finds after a proper hearing that a fraud has
been practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been
defiled, the entire cost of the proceedings could justly be assessed
against the guilty parties. Such is precisely the situation where "for
dominating reasons of justice"
a court may assess counsel fees as a
49
part of the taxable costs.
In City Bank of Honolulu v. Rivera Davila,5 0 the Ninth Circuit
upheld a court award of $15,000.00 in attorneys' fees. Noting that
the defendant had "greatly and unnecessarily prolonged the trial by
injecting irrelevancies, by refusing to admit facts patently true, and
by making statements and later contradicting himself," the court
held that this conduct provided "ample basis for awarding attorneys'
fees." 5
The award of attorneys' fees for bad faith conduct on the part of
the fraudulent or harassing party carries an implicit caveat which
should be recognized by the litigant contemplating the initiation of a
public interest environmental action. Either the plaintiff or the
defendant may be held guilty of bad faith and thus assessed legal fees
46. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). It is conclusively established within the language of the
Alyeska Pipeline opinion that the "private attorney general" exception to the general rule
against fee shifting only exists where provided for by congressional enactment.
47. The exception was first enunciated in admiralty. See e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 379 (1824) (dictum).
48. 328 U.S. 575 (1946).
49. Id. at 580.
50. 438 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 1371.
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under the doctrine. Thus, in Gazon v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,I 2 for
example, the court allowed a fee award in a stockholder's suit for
injunctive relief initiated "without any basis" and brought "solely
for the purpose 'of
annoying and harassing the defendant corporation
'
and its business. 1 3
The lawyer contemplating the initiation of a public interest lawsuit solely as a dilatory tactic designed to postpone or thwart a
proposed development should take heed to the warning issued by the
Gazon court. In Gazon, the court employed strong language in
admonishing against just such a tactic. The court termed the plaintiffs action a "fishing expedition" and noted that "every fisherman,
including novices, realizes that anyone who contemplates a fishing
trip must be prepared to pay the expenses." ' 4
The bad faith exception has found acceptance as a vehicle for the
recovery of attorneys' fees subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska, however. In Doe v. Poelker,5I a case arising out of
the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiff brought suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the local hospitals' practice of refusing to
perform abortions. The court, after first noting that the Alyeska
Pipeline opinion had established that the private attorney general
exception applied only where specifically provided for by congressional enactment, nevertheless was convinced that an award of
attorneys' fees was proper under the bad faith exception. The court
took notice of the fact that the defendants, and particularly the
mayor of the city, refused to permit abortions for over a year
despite the clear pronouncements of the United States Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade' 6 and Doe v. Bolton5 7 to the contrary.
Judge Charles R. Richey,' 8 writing on the prospects for employing the bad faith exception after the Alyeska Pipeline decision,
commented:
[G] iven the tone of the decision in Alyeska, the court will be on
guard to prevent the exceptions from swallowing the rule; in fact,
this concern may even result in a narrowing of the exceptions, which
to this date have been rather loosely articulated. Furthermore, where
52. 6 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. N.Y. 1934).
53. Id. at 568.
54. Id.
55. 515 F.2d 541,548 (8th Cir. 1975).
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
58. Much of what Judge Richey has written and observed on the Alyeska Pipeline v.
Wilderness Society case was derived from his firsthand knowledge of the litigation. The
Honorable Charles R. Richey is currently a Judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, and he enjoyed the unique position of having had the original suit
brought before this court.
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it appears even to a small degree that the suit was brought or defended in the belief that a position was at least arguable, courts will
not be receptive to an application for attorneys' fees. And, finally,
courts may also be reluctant to invoke this exception since, to a
certain extent, it reflects upon losing counsel. 5 9
In the area of public interest environmental litigation, the bad
faith exception may be a difficult tool with which to obtain
attorneys' fees. The subjective problems inherent in the proof of bad
faith conduct may have a limiting effect on the use of the doctrine as
a viable means for fee recovery. Indeed, this double-edged exception
may have the ultimate effect of operating as a sort of regulating
mechanism by which to cause the prospective litigant to weigh the
merits of his action.
The Award of Attorneys' Fees for Disobedienceof a
Court Order Exception
A second, and potentially more fruitful, exception to the
American Rule involves the situation where a party has willfully
disobeyed an order of the court. In Toledo Scales Co. v. Computing
Sale Co.,6 the Court held that it was "in the discretion of the court
whose dignity has been offended and whose process has been obstructed" to decide the degree of punishment for contempt in a
proceeding involving a party guilty of obstructing the entry of a
court decree. In that instance, it was held not to be an abuse of
discretion to "impose, as a penalty, compensation for the expenses
incurred by the successful party to the decree in defending its
rights . .

*6

In a similar factual setting, wherein the prevailing party to a bankruptcy proceeding was forced to initiate civil contempt proceedings
in order to preserve and protect his adjudicated right, the court held
him to be entitled to a decree "which may include, in the discretion
of the court, an award of reasonable attorneys' fees." A major consideration in determining whether attorneys' fees should be awarded
was viewed to be the "willfulness inherent in the contemptuous
6
act.", 2

Of particular importance to the public interest environmental
attorney, however, is the relative success that the "disobedience of a
59.
1975).
60.
61.
62.

Richey, Attorneys' Fees: A Two-Pronged Problem, 11 Trial 59, 62-65 (Nov./Dec.
261 U.S. 399 (1923).
Id. at 328.
In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 657, 658 (7 Cir. 1955).
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court order" exception has enjoyed in the area of environmental
litigation. Situations to which the doctrine manifestly lends itself
include those where a recalcitrant administrative agency or a polluting industry have shown a repeated willingness to disobey clear legal
mandates emanating
either from within or outside the subject court
63
proceedings.
In the case of private corporate defendants, often the guilty
polluting party will be similarly guilty of a corporate policy of
obstructing or delaying agency efforts to enforce environmental
controls. Thus, in the case of Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert,6"
evidence was introduced at trial which showed that over a period of
years the defendant corporation had knowingly discharged fluorides
from its aluminum plant despite the fact that control devices were
available. The court had no difficulty in affirming an award of
punative damages based on the unusually candid admission of the
plant manager that, "It is cheaper to pay claims than it is to control
6
fluorides."
There are, however, certain potential pitfalls to the employment
of this "obdurate behavior" exception against a recalcitrant corporate or administrative defendant. These problem areas are particularly forseeable in the practical, procedural and tactical
considerations surrounding the use of the exception. In Reynolds,
for example, proof of willful disobedience was made infinitely easier
by the polluting plant manager's admission of corporate policy for
the record. In most cases, the plaintiff's burden of proving willful
disobedience or obdurate behavior will be considerably more diffi6
cult. 6
Furthermore, in the case of the administrative defendant, the
plaintiff's burden is made even more complicated by the broad range
of generally acceptable administrative exercises of discretion and the
presumption of the correctness of administrative action. 6 7
Despite these potential shortcomings, however, the doctrine poses
an interesting alternative avenue for the environmental litigant who
seeks to recover attorneys' fees. Although the court in Alyeska v.
Wilderness Society refrained from employing the rationale, it nevertheless took pains to emphasize that the decision went solely to
the issue of the private attorney general theory for fee awards. The
Supreme Court noted that their decision in no way affected the
63. King & Plater supra note 1, at 58.
64. 324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1963).

65. Id. at 466.
66. King & Plater supra note 1, at 58.

67. Id. at 59.
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"inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular
situations." 6 8
The "EquitableFund" Exception
The equitable fund exception to the American Rule has, over
time, developed into a two-pronged avenue by which attorneys' fees
may be obtained. In the first area, that of the establishment of a
common fund, the exception has been left virtually unchanged by
the language of the Supreme Court in Alyeska. 6 9 In the second area,
however, that of the creation of a substantial benefit, the Court has
made severe inroads into the concept as a viable means for obtaining
fees in environmental litigation.
The common fund theory has generally achieved wide judicial
acceptance as an exception to the American Rule because the fee
awards, at least ostensibly, do not come out of the losing party's
pocket. Rather, the award may be described as "monies that are due
to others who are benefiting from the action of the plaintiff. . . and
who must pay for their benefit." The monies, however, are not taken
directly from the benefited class members individually. To do so
would be wholly impracticable. Instead, the fee award is taken from
the common fund itself and, as a consequence, in personam jurisdiction is not necessary. 7 °
The common fund exception was first enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Trustees v. Greenough.7 In that action, a
bondholder acting on behalf of himself and other bondholders enjoying an equal interest in a common fund, successfully rescued that
fund from waste arising out of the misconduct of the trustee. The
Court held:
[W) here one of many parties having a common interest in a trust
fund, at his own expense takes proper proceedings to save it from
destruction and to restore it to the purposes of the trust, he is
entitled to reimbursement, either out of the fund itself, or by proportional contribution from those who accept the benefit of his
efforts' 2
That rule has been uniformly adhered
to by the United States
73
Supreme Court on numerous occasions.
68. 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975).

69. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
259-260 (1975).
70. Richey supra note 59, at 65. See also National Council of Community Health Centers
v. Weinberger, infra note 76.
71. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
72. Id. at 532-33.

73. See Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Harrison v.
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In a similar factual setting, an individual bank depositer, although
not professing to sue as a member of a class, was awarded her costs
because her success would have a stare decisis effect entitling the
other fourteen bank depositors similarly situated to recover out of
the specific assets of the same defendant. The Court in Sprague v.
Ticonic NationalBank,7 4 wrote:
Whether one professes to sue representatively or formally makes a
fund available for others may, of course, be a relevant circumstance
in making the fund liable for his costs in producing it. But when
such a fund is for all practical purposes created for the benefit of
others, the formalities of the litigation-the absence of an avowed
class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis
rather than through a decree-hardly touch the power of equity in
doing justice as between a party and the beneficiaries of his
litigation. 75
Thus, in the eyes of the Court, it was of little consequence that the
action was pursued by an individual and not by a member of a class.
So long as an easily ascertainable class was the recipient of the
benefits of the plaintiff's litigation, the Court held that the expenses
could be paid out of the common fund, despite the fact that the
proceeds of the fund had not been paid directly into the court.
In the more recent case, National Council of Community Health
Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger,7 6 the court awarded attorneys' fees
from an unexpended fund held by H.E.W. Representing one hundred
thirty-eight community health centers, the plaintiffs succeeded in
setting aside an impoundment order withholding some 52 million
dollars which Congress had appropriated for the fiscal year. Although
the court first noted that, absent specific statutory language to the
contrary, attorneys' fees may not be awarded against the Government, 7 7 or against officers of the Government relating to their
specific duties,7 8 it nevertheless held:
The law is settled that where a fund has been created in litigation
with the Government, and the Government stands as it does here in
the position of a stakeholder required to pay over that fund to
Perea, 168 U.S. 311, 325-326 (1897); United States Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 783
(1931); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
74. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
75. Id. at 166-167.
76. 387 F. Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1974).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 20 (1926);
United States v. Worley, 281 U.S. 339 (1930); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 499
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1351 (1975).
78. See 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1971), para. 54.75 (4).
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qualified beneficiaries, the court may award a portion of it to the
attorney for the beneficiaries as "costs between solicitor and
client. 9
Parenthetically, however, it should be noted that the court refused
to accept plaintiffs counsel's contingency fee request. The court
noted, "the amount released was determined by Congress, not by
the litigation. The only contingency was whether or not the plaintiff
class would win or lose.. . his work [plaintiff s counsel] contributed
in no way to the amount of the award but only to the fact of the
award itself."' 0
The equitable fund exception, although still a viable avenue for
recovering attorneys' fees after Alyeska, is nevertheless of limited
value in environmental litigation. Unlike commercial litigation,
public interest environmental litigation is not likely to produce any
monetary common fund from which a fee award could be drawn.
Prior to Alyeska, however, the courts were willing to award
attorneys' fees to litigants who asserted the public interest and who
had performed a substantial benefit to a large class of beneficiaries.
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 8 the Supreme Court first
enunciated the substantial benefit variation to the equitable fund
exception.' 2 The substantial benefit doctrine arose out of an action
involving a minority shareholder's derivative suit challenging the
methods and manner in which the stockholder's votes were being
solicited. The allegedly misleading proxy statement was made by the
management of the recently merged corporation in violation of
section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 In dealing
with the issue of the award of interim attorneys' fees, the Court was
initially confronted with its own language some three years earlier
denying a fee award in a similar situation.
In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,"4 the
Supreme Court declined to award attorneys' fees in an action arising
out of the infringement of a trademark under the Lanham Act.8 5
The Court concluded that, "Congress intended § 35 of the Lanham
Act to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in
cases arising under the Act. A judicially created compensatory
79. 387 F. Supp. 991, 994 (1974).
80. Id. at 995.
81. 396 U.S. 375 (1970),
82. The "substantial benefit" test was first announced in the earlier decision of Bosch v.
Meeker Cooperative Power and Light Ass'n., 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
84. 386 U.S. 714 (1967),
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970).
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remedy in addition to the express statutory remedies is inappro8
priate." 6
The Mills Court, noting that its earlier decision was based on the
fact that "Congress had meticulously detailed the remedies available," 8 7 looked to the statutory language of the Securities Exchange
Act. In contrast to the Lanham Act, the Court concluded "we
cannot fairly infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose to circumscribe the Court's power to grant appropriate
remedies." 8 Noting that the development of the common fund
exception had contemplated the prevention of unjust enrichment by
beneficiaries at the expense of the plaintiff, the Court took pains to
emphasize that equity did not distinguish between monetary and
non-monetary benefit. The Mills Court acknowledged that litigation
could provide a substantial benefit on a class whether or not the
benefit was pecuniary in nature. 9 Thus, the Court was able to hold
that a private stockholder action involved in vindicating the statutory
policy of Congress justified an award of attorneys' fees to be paid
from the larger class of shareholders who benefited by the plaintiff's
action. 90
The doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Mills and later
affirmed in Hall v. Cole,9 1 actually was a hybrid in that it contained
elements of the private attorney general rationale, as well as those
found in the "substantial benefit" concept. Indeed, the effects of
both doctrines are quite similar. Yet, while the two exceptions are
fundamentally the same in their net result of shifting the fee burden,
their respective rationales are quite different. While the substantial
benefit rule taxes the class who benefits from the initiation of the
action, the private attorney general theory taxes the defendant
because the plaintiff has vindicated a strong public policy and
similarly performed a public service. 9 2 The advantage of the private
attorney general theory of fee recovery to the prospective environmental litigant over the substantial benefit approach, which requires
some finding as to the class benefited by the plaintiff's environ86. 386 U.S. 714, 721 (1967).
87. 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970).
88. Id. at 391.
89. Id. at 392. The United States Supreme Court noted, "The fact that this suit has not
yet produced, and may never produce, a monetary recovery from which the fees could be
paid does not preclude an award based on this rationale."

90. Id. at 396.
91. 412 U.S. 1 (1973), has been followed in other, more recent labor cases. See e.g.
Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
918 (1973).
92. Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58
Cornell L. Rev. 1222, 1238 (1973).
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mental action, is that the private attorney general theory allows for
direct recovery. It was just this reasoning that contributed to the
increased use of the private attorney general rationale in fee shifting
awards arising out of public interest environmental litigation.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION
The "private attorney general" exception first appeared as a
vehicle for fee shifting in the area of civil rights and, in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises,9 3 the exception was given the status of black
letter law by the United States Supreme Court.
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises involved a successful suit to
enjoin racial discrimination at a series of drive-in restaurants. Rejecting a narrow lower court interpretation, the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of "reasonable" counsel fees
at the Court's "discretion. "' 9 4
In so holding, the Supreme Court looked to the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court noted that suits initiated
Since a
under Title II of the Act were "private in form only."'
plaintiff bringing an action under Title 11 could not recover damages
but only injunctive relief, he was not acting for himself but rather
"vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority." 9 6 The Court reasoned that Congress had enacted the
provision for counsel fees "to encourage individuals injured by racial
discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II." I
The private vindication of Congressional policies of the highest
priority received recognition in other civil rights actions involving
statutes that were silent as to the award of counsel fees. In Lee v.
Southern Home Sites Corp.,' 8 the issue before the Fifth Circuit was
whether a defendant who refused to sell lots to Negroes on the same
terms as he sold lots to whites was liable to the plaintiff for counsel
fees, when 42 U.S.C. 1982 was silent on the issue. The court, recognizing the importance of the rights being asserted, 9 9 was able to
conclude:
93. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
94. "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorneys' fee as a
part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for the costs the same as a private
person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b).
95. 390 U.S. 400,401 (1968).
96. Id. at 402.
97. Id.
98. 444 F.2d 143 (1971).
99. Id. at 147. The court evaluated the factors relied on in Piggie Park Enterprises and
concluded, "the policy against discrimination in the sale or rental of property is equally
strong."
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Section 1982 is not a statute providing detailed remedies, and thus
the policy of effectuating congressional purpose does not militate
against an award of attorney's fees. Additionally, here as in Mills
there is a strong congressional policy behind the rights declared in
1982. Awarding attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs would facilitate the enforcement of that policy through private litigation.! 00
In the more recent case of Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 0 plaintiffs
successfully sought injunctive relief against the racially discriminatory practices of testing and hiring applicants for a municipal fire
department under Sections 1981 and 1983.1 2 The court, after
taking judicial notice of the trend toward expanding attorneys' fee
awards in civil rights litigation emanating from both the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts,' 1 3 concluded that such a suit
"clearly furthers the will of congress that such discrimination should
be eliminated." The court further noted that Congress had already
contemplated attorney fee awards in certain employment discrimination provisions found contained under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.' 04 Thus, a,fee award was deemed to be an "effective
device in furthering its [Congress'] policy that there be no racial
discrimination in employment."' 0I
The private attorney general rationale employed by both the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in awarding attorneys'
fees in civil rights litigation soon found its way into the area of
public interest environmental litigation. Thus, in 1972, the first application of the private attorney general exception to the American
Rule in environmental litigation appeared in La Raza Unida v.

Volpe.'

06

The suit involved a class action seeking to enjoin the construction
of a California highway project 1 0 7 on the grounds that the defendants failed to meet federal environmental and housing assistance
standards.1 0 8

In awarding attorneys' fees under the private attorney general
100. Id. at 145.
101. 498 F.2d 143 (1974).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1983 (1964).
103. 498 F.2d 143, 145 (1974).
104. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964).
105. 498 F.2d 143, 146 (1974).
106. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
107. 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
108. Defendants, California Department of Highways, Department of Public Works and
the Chief Highway Engineer for the State of California, were all named for their failure to
comply with § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 dealing with housing
displacement and relocation. Although these statutes are silent as to the award of attorneys'
fees, the court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a reasonable award. 57
F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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exception, the La Raza court cited three criteria which guided its
decision. They included: (a) "the effectuation of strong Congressional Policies"; 1 9 (b) "the number of people who have
benefited from plaintiffs' efforts"; 1 0° and (c) "the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement."' I I Concluding that the
plaintiffs had successfully met these three criteria, the court exercised its "equitable powers" to award attorney and witness fees.
The court noted that the fee award would come from the state
treasury but it was nevertheless able to conclude that the fee award
matched "to the extent that the Court's jurisdiction over the matter
makes possible, the costs and the benefits of litigation."' 1 2
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EnvironmentalProtection Agency,' ' decided one year later, the First Circuit was
asked to exact attorneys' fees from an agency of the Federal Government. The petitioners had successfully obtained orders requiring the
Environmental Protection Agency to comply with certain of its
obligations under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.1 1 4
The court took judicial notice of the statutory goals of the Clean
Air Amendments and the fact that the petitioners were forced to
activate "the traditional adversary machinery for bringing issues
before the court"' ' in order to facilitate this stated policy goal.
The court reasoned, "the potential award of attorneys' fees was a
logical complement to the right to bring citizen suits."' ' 6 In holding
that an award of attorneys' fees was justified, the court chose not to
pass on the question of sovereign immunity and the recovery of fees
from the Government. The court noted with approval that the wording of the Clean Air Amendments contained statutory provisions
authorizing the award of fees.' ' 7 Looking to the public service that
the petitioners performed, the court observed:
As a result [of the initiation of the Plaintiffs' action] policies of the
EPA have been corrected and others, upheld, have been removed
from the arena of dispute. Presumptively the public has benefittednot only in Rhode Island and Massachusetts but nationally, as
neither air pollution nor the movement of citizenry respect state
boundries, and some of the legal principles at issue have national as
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
Clean Air Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. § § 1857c-5 etseq. (1970).
484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1335.
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well as regional import. Petitioners have thus helped to enforce,
refine and clarify the law. They can be said to have assisted the EPA
in achieving its statutory goals.' 1 s
Thus, the court was able to hold that "to allocate petitioners' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees is to spread them ultimately among the
taxpaying public, which receives the benefit of this litigation."' I9
As we have seen from our analysis of La Raza and National
Resources Defense Council, the federal courts were willing to award
attorneys' fees, under the private attorney general exception,
against state agencies and officials and against agencies of the Federal
Government. In Wilderness Society v. Morton,' 20 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to extend the fee
shifting exception still further to include awards of attorneys' fees as
against private individuals.
In Wilderness Society v. Morton, plaintiff's suit to recover attorneys' fees was based on claims brought under the Mineral Leasing
Act and under the National Environmental Policy Act.' 21 The Court
of Appeals, per Judge Skelly Wright, adopted the private attorney
general exception to the traditional rule against fee shifting and
held the defendant, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, liable for one
half the reasonable value of the services rendered to the plaintiff by
counsel. 1 22 Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 operated as a bar to the
imposition of an attorneys' fee award on the federal defendants, the
court held that the plaintiff, Wilderness Society, was to assume the
other half of the total cost of the litigation. In view of the size and
expense of the award represented by even one half of the total cost
of the litigation, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company appealed the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals.' 23 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari' 24 in order that the issue of
whether such an award of attorneys' fees was appropriate could be
resolved.
118. Id. at 1334.

119. Id.
120. 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

121. See supra at note 9. Plaintiffs' suit for declaratory and injunctive relief brought
under the Mineral Leasing Act, § 28 as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1971) was brought on
the ground that the statutory pipeline right-of-way width provision had been violated. A
second cause of action, alleging insufficiency in the preparation of the environmental impact
statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § § 2 et seq., 42
U.S.C. § § 4321 et seq. (1973) was subsequently mooted by the Congressional passage of
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 203 (c,d), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1652) (c,d) (1976).
122. 495 F.2d 1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
123. Defendant, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's liability for one half of the Wilderness Society's bill of costs included one half liability for the total of 4,455 hours of

attorneys' time spent on the litigation. See 421 U.S. 240, 245 at note 13 (1975).
124. Cert.granted, 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
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In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the Court
chose to defer to Congress for statutory authority to award
attorneys' fees against a private individual. The Court noted that to
hold otherwise would "make major inroads on a policy matter that
Congress has reserved for itself."' 2 I The Supreme Court, after an
extensive examination of the development of the American Rule and
the rationale underlying the traditional policy against fee shifting,
concluded:
Since the approach taken by Congress to this issue has been to carve
out specific exceptions to a general rule that federal courts cannot
award attorneys' fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 1923, those
courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the
allowance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation or to pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under
which they sue and to award fees in some cases but not in others,
depending upon the court's assessment of the importance of the
public policies involved in particular cases. Nor should the federal
courts purport to adopt on their own initiative a rule awarding
attorneys' fees based on the private attorney general approach when
such judicial rule will operate only against private parties and not
against the Government.' 2 6
In view of the unmistakably clear pronouncement of the United
States Supreme Court, it appears that, at least in the area of public
interest litigation against a private individual or concern, the
American Rule is going to be with us for some time. However, as
Judge Richey observed, "there are avenues for obtaining attorneys'
fees: by exception to the Rule and by statute." He also cautions,
however, that "counsel will have to be imaginative and innovative.,"1 2 7 Let us then examine some of the avenues for the recovery
of attorneys' fees that remain available after Alyeska.
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AFTER ALEYSKA v. WILDERNESS SOCIETY
As we have noted from the preceeding discussion of the equitable
powers of the court to award attorney and expert witness fees, there
appears to be little help to be obtained from the courts in recovering
fees in public interest environmental litigation. However, in addition
to the court's equitable powers to award fees, in limited circumstances, Congress has provided a variety of statutory fee provisions
125. 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975).

126. Id.

127. Richey, supra note 59, at 66.
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involving a multitude of areas, including the environment. In these
instances, the fee awards may be made either at the discretion of the
court' 28 or mandated by the language of the statute.' 29
The Alyeska Pipeline decision may be read as an invitation for
Congress to act on the issue of fee awards. Indeed, in this area
Congress has already begun to respond.
On January 26, 1976, Senator James L. Buckley (C-R-N.Y.) introduced S. 2871, The Equal Access to Courts Act of 1976, for the
stated purpose of "ending the injustice of requiring successful parties
in such actions [actions between private parties and the government]
to bear their legal expenses without reimbursement." The scope of
the bill contemplates the reimbursement of legal fees to a prevailing
party in both criminal and civil actions involving private parties and
the Federal Government, as well as in both civil and criminal actions
initiated by the Federal Government and by administrative agencies.
The bill, which seeks to amend the existing bar to the recovery of
attorneys' fees contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2412'130 like its predecessor S. 2530, has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Com-

mittee.'

31

It should be noted, however, that this statutory provision is
designed to compensate the prevailing party only in litigation involving private parties and the Federal Government. With few exceptions,
the American Rule against fee shifting remains the law of the land
with reference to actions between private parties.' 32
Some states, however, have fee award provisions which are not
found at the Federal level. A wise attorney would do well to examine
his state fee recovery statutes. In diversity actions, this precaution
may be quite helpful in framing causes of action so as to capitalize
on the fee award provisions.
In Alaska, for an example, except where otherwise provided by
128. An example of a statute containing a discretionary fee award provision may be
found in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See also supra
note 83.
129. An example of a mandatory fee award provision may be seen in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5K (1974). See also 95 S.Ct. 1624.
130. Earlier, on October 20, 1975, Senator Buckley introduced S. 2530, The Equal
Access to Courts Act of 1975. The Bill provided for reimbursement of legal fees to prevailing parties in civil litigation involving the government and private parties. The Equal Access
to Courts Act of 1976, S. 2871, extends S. 2530 to include both criminal and civil actions
initiated by the federal government and by administrative agencies.
131. At present there are nine bills pending in the Congress addressing themselves to the
problem of reimbursement of attorneys' fees and costs in suits between the Federal government and companies or individuals.
132. It should be noted, however, that the "American Rule" does not stand as a bar
against the award of punative damages in environmental tort actions involving private
parties. See Reynolds Metals Co., vs. Lampert, supra at note 64.
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statute "the supreme court shall determine what costs, if any, including attorneys' fees, shall be allowed the prevailing party in any
case.,"1 33 In addition, the Alaska Code of Civil Procedure provides
that "unless the court, in its discretion otherwise directs," a fixed
schedule of attorneys' fees will be followed for the party recovering a
money judgment.1 34 This Alaskan fixed schedule for the recovery of
fees is a rarity within the United States but it appears to be one
alternative method by which to eliminate the ancillary proceedings
which occur under the English system solely for the purpose of
adjudicating a proper attorneys' fee award.1 3
The future of the Ameican Rule after Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society will be shaped by the Congress, state
legislatures and perhaps even federal and state administrative agencies
through their rulemaking powers. The lesson to be learned from the
Supreme Court, at least for the moment, is that the federal courts are
no longer at liberty to award attorneys' fees at their discretion.
Therefore, the public interest environmental litigant would do well
to research the available existing avenues for obtaining his attorneys'
fees. The Supreme Court has issued its pronouncement on the matter
of fee shifting. It now remains to be seen how the Congress and the
legislatures of the states will respond.
FREDRJCK W.LEDBETTER
133. Alas. Stat. Sec. 09.60.010 (1973). Costs allowed prevailing party.
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the supreme court shall determine by
rule or order what costs, if any, including attorney fees, shall be allowed the
prevailing party in any case.

134. Alas. R. Civ. P. 82(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party as Costs.
(1) Unless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs, the following
schedule of attorney's fees will be adhered to in fixing such fees for the party

recovering any money judgment therein, as part of the costs of the action
allowed by law:

First

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN AVERAGE CASES
Non-Contested
Without Trial
Contested
15%
20%
25%
$ 2,000

Next $ 3,000
Next $ 5,000
Over $10,000

20%
15%
10%

15%
12.5%
7.5%

12.5%
10%
5%

Should no recovery be had, attorney's fees for the prevailing party may be

fixed by the court as a part of the costs of the action, in its discretion, in a
reasonable amount.
(2) In actions where the money judgment is not an accurate criteria for
determining the fee to be allowed to the prevailing side, the court shall award
a fee commensurate with the amount and value of legal services rendered.
(3) The allowance of attorney's fees by the court in conformance with the
foregoing schedule is not to be construed as fixing the fees between attorney
and client.
135. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
See also text supra at note 26.

